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Add cloud key store, API client, and sync identity flows
cloud_keys: device private key + master key live in the OS keychain (keyring), namespaced per cloud account — never in the local DB. Headless installs without a keychain get a hard error, not a plaintext fallback. cloud_api: async httpx client for the bearer-key surface (devices, account-key escrow, object push/commit, sync pull). Presigned blob transfers use a separate unauthenticated client so the bearer key never reaches the storage host. cloud_account: the design-doc §9 flows — first-device setup mints MK + recovery phrase (returned for one-time display), later devices register and either adopt a wrapped MK provisioned by an existing device or restore from the phrase. sync_device_id lands on cloud_settings with an idempotent migration. Tests run the real flows against an in-process fake cloud and assert the master key and phrase never appear in any request body. A full round-trip integration test (encrypt -> push -> pull -> decrypt -> tombstone) runs against a live dev server when VOICEBOX_CLOUD_TEST_API/KEY are set.
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@@ -78,6 +78,11 @@ def generate_device_keypair() -> tuple[bytes, bytes]:
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return bytes(private), bytes(private.public_key)
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def device_public_key(device_private_key: bytes) -> bytes:
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"""Re-derive the public half from a stored private key."""
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return bytes(PrivateKey(device_private_key).public_key)
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def wrap_master_key_for_device(master_key: bytes, device_public_key: bytes) -> bytes:
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"""Seal MK to another device's public key (run on an *existing* device when
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provisioning a new one). Only the target device's private key can open it."""
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